TUFTS  philosophy


People | Faculty | Jody Azzouni
 

Jody Azzouni was born in NYC. Apart from the philosophy he does, he has a degree in mathematics. As a result, his first philosophy book, Metaphysical Myths, Mathematical Practice: The Ontology and Epistemology of the Exact Sciences, is in philosophy of mathematics. His second book in philosophy of science is Knowledge and Reference in Empirical Science. His third and fourth books, Deflating Existential Commitment: A Case for Nominalism and Tracking Reason: Proof, Consequence, and Truth, appeared with Oxford University Press.

Apart from this he publishes poems and short stories: azzouni.com.

jody.azzouni@tufts.edu
jodyazzouni@mindspring.com
617-627-2345
Miner 221B
OHs: M 1:30-2:30, T 12:00-1:20 or by appt


Recent Publications

Books
1994Metaphysical Myths, Mathematical Practice. Cambridge University Press.
2000Knowledge and Reference in Empirical Science. Routledge.
2004Deflating Existential Consequence: A Case for Nominalism. Oxford University Press.
2006Tracking Reason: Proof, Consequence and Truth. Oxford University Press.

Articles

Prof. Azzouni contributes to Polimetrica, a scholarly dictionary based out in Milan. See, e.g., his "Logic".

The following papers are available in .pdf form.
2005Is there still a sense in which mathematics can have foundations? In G. Sica, ed., Essays on the Foundations of Mathematics and Logic. Polimetrica, 9-47.
2008The compulsion to believe: Logical inference and normativity. ProtoSociology 25: 69-88.

The following papers are available in either offprint form or as copies. Please send a message to jodyazzouni@mindspring.com with a postal address and a list of which papers from among these that you would like.
1990 Truth and convention. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 71, 81-102.
1991 A simple axiomatizable theory of truth. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 32, 3: 458-93.
1992 A priori truth. Erkenntnis 37, 327-46.
1995 Review of Aladdin M. Yaqub's The Liar Speaks the Truth. Mind 104, 413: 222-25.
1997 Thick epistemic access: Distinguishing the mathematical from the empirical. The Journal of Philosophy 94: 472-84.
Applied mathematics, existential commitment and the Quine-Putnam indispensability thesis. Philosophia Mathematica 5, 3: 193-209.
1998 On "On what there is". Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79, 1-18.
1999 Review of Michael D. Resnik's Mathematics as a science of patterns. Journal of Symbolic Logic 64, 2: 922-3.
Comments on Shapiro. The Journal of Philosophy 96: 541-44.
2000 Applying mathematics: An attempt to design a philosophical problem. The Monist 82, 2: 209-27.
Stipulation, logic, and ontological independence. Philosophia Mathematica 3, 8: 225-54.
2001 Truth via anaphorically restricted quantifiers. The Journal of Philosophical Logic 30: 329-54.
2003 Individuation, causal relations and Quine. In Mark Richard, ed., Meaning. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 197-219.
The strengthened liar, the expressive strength of natural languages, and regimentation. The Philosophical Forum, 34, 3&4: 329-50.
2004 Proof and ontology in Euclidean mathematics. In Tinne Hoff Kjeldsen, Stig Andur Pedersen, Lise Mariane Sonne-Hanse, eds., New trends in the history and philosophy of mathematics. Denmark: University Press of Southern Denmark, 117-33.
The derivation-indicator view of mathematical practice. Philosophia Mathematica 3, 12: 81-105.
Theory, observation and scientific realism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55: 371-92.
Tarski, Quine, and the transcendence of the vernacular "true". Synthese 142: 273-88.
2005 How to nominalize formalism. Philosophia Mathematica (III) 13: 135-159.
Anaphorically unrestricted quantifiers and paradoxes. In J. C. Beall and Bradley Armour-Garb, eds., Deflationism and Paradox, 250-273. Oxford University Press.
(With Bradley Armour-Garb.) Standing on common ground. Journal of Philosophy CII (10): 532-544.
(With Otavio Bueno.) Review of Donald MacKenzie's Mechanizing Proof: Computing, Risk, and Trust. Philosophia Mathematica (III) 13: 319-325.
2006 How and why mathematics is unique as a social practice. In Reuben Hersh, ed., 18 unconventional essays on the nature of mathematics. Springer Science+Business Media, Inc.
2007 The inconsistency of natural languages: How we live with it. Inquiry 50:6, 590-605.
Ontological commitment in the vernacular. Noûs 41:2, 204-226.
2008 Alternative logics and the role of truth in the interpretation of languages. In Douglas Patterson, ed., New essays on Tarski and philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 390-429.
A cause for concern: Standard abstracta and causation. Philosophia Mathematica (III) 16, 397-401.
(With Otavio Bueno.) On what it takes for there to be no fact of the matter. Noûs 42:4, 753-769.



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