

Global horizontal (or social) inequalities

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Leontief Prize Lecture, Tufts University, Medford, MA 02155
March 7, 2013

There is increasing concern with the growth of both national and global inequalities. In the national context, the inequalities of concern mostly relate to inequalities among individuals (or households) within a nation, while global inequalities generally refer to inequalities between nations. In both arenas, social or horizontal inequalities are neglected, i.e. inequalities among groups with shared identities (such as racial, ethnic, religious or gender categories). These social or horizontal inequalities (henceforth termed HIs) are the central focus of this paper. The first part of the paper discusses what is meant by HIs; the second part, why HIs are important; and the third part provides an important global example of HIs – that is the inequalities between Muslims and non-Muslims across the world - with strong implications for global justice and for global political stability.

1. Defining HIs

Horizontal inequalities are inequalities between groups of people who share a common identity. Potentially people may be categorised in many ways. Here I concentrate on identity groups that are widely recognised to be of social and/or political significance both by those who share such an identity and by those who don't. In practice, significant group distinctions often arise from differences in religion (for example, differences between major religions, such as Muslims and Christians, and groupings within them, such as Shia and Sunni, Catholic and Protestant); in some societies ethnic distinctions are important (for example, Ewes and Akans in Ghana, Igbo, Hausa-Fulani and Yoruba in Nigeria); in some – such as India and Nepal – caste is the main basis of social distinction and discrimination; in some places, geographical distinctions are important (often accompanied by some ethnic or religious differences), such as in East Timor or Eritrea; and in others, what we call 'race' seems to be the significant differentiating group characteristic, such as in Malaysia or Brazil. Gender and age are other important identities which are relevant to every society.

Socially significant group identities arise partly from individuals' *own* perceptions of membership of and identity with a particular group and partly from the perceptions of *those outside the group* about others. An important question – long debated by anthropologists¹ – then is why and when

¹ See Banks (1996) and Ukiwo (2005) for that debate.

some differences are perceived as being socially significant, and others are not, both by group members themselves and by others. Here we will not enter that debate, but note that group distinctions are formed and reformed historically; that leaders, educators and the media, among others, are important influences over how significant group distinctions evolve; that groups often have uncertain boundaries, and are fluid, with new groups emerging and old ones ceasing to be important. Yet despite the fact that boundaries evolve, at any one time group distinctions are often an important element in the way that people see themselves, and interact, and consequently are relevant to the wellbeing of individuals and the health of society. Moreover, as ideology has become less important as a source of identity and political mobilisation, ethnic and religious distinctions seem to have become more important, as indicated by the practice of ‘ethnic voting’ common especially in African countries (Posner 2005), and the increasing proportion of violent conflicts that are presented as ‘ethnic’.

HIIs encompass economic, social, political and cultural status dimensions:

- Economic HIIs include inequalities in ownership of assets – financial, natural resource-based, human and social – and of incomes and employment opportunities that depend on these assets and the general conditions of the economy.
- Social HIIs include access to a range of services – education, health and housing – and inequalities in achievements in health and educational outcomes.
- Political HIIs consist in inequalities in the group distribution of political opportunities and power, including control over the presidency, the cabinet, parliamentary assemblies, the army, police and regional and local Governments.
- Cultural status HIIs refer to differences in recognition and (de facto) hierarchical status of different groups’ cultural norms, customs and practices.²

HIIs are of importance for three reasons: first, because most approaches to defining justice would concur that they are unjust; secondly, from a medium to long run perspective they are liable to be inefficient; and, finally, they have been shown to raise the risk of violent conflict.

2. Is Horizontal Equality Desirable?

² The concept of cultural status inequalities was first introduced by Arnim Langer and Graham Brown. See Langer, A and Brown, G. 2008 ‘Cultural Status Inequalities: An important dimension of group mobilisation’ in: Stewart, F. *Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding group violence in multiethnic societies*, Basingstoke: Palgrave.

There are many ways of approaching the complex question of why inequality is (or is not) undesirable both with respect to vertical inequality and to horizontal inequality. This is a central issue for many philosophers, and for some economists. Ultimately, the question of distributive justice is a normative issue is for each person to decide for themselves.³ Yet the arguments of many philosophers and some economists point to injustice in group inequality, even where they see some justification for inequality among individuals.

The different disciplines have taken different approaches to the question. Philosophers start from basic principles and explore the implications for equality arising from them, with conclusions differing according to the starting point. Economists are concerned to identify the distribution which maximises accepted societal objectives and their conclusions depend on how these objectives are defined, and how they are affected by different distributions. For both approaches, most discussion has been concerned with inequality among individuals (vertical inequality). Below I draw on some of these discussions and interpret the arguments in terms of horizontal inequalities. My conclusions are that there are stronger reasons for believing HIs are unjust than in relation to VI.

View of some philosophers:

This section considers four philosophical approaches to the question of justice and distribution: first, those derived from a conception of shared humanity ((Kant 1949); (Williams 1962; Anderson 1999); secondly, analysis of the implications of a posited social contract (Rousseau, 1762; 1968; (Rawls 1971); thirdly, what has come to be known as ‘luck egalitarianism’ (Dworkin 1981; Cohen 1989; Roemer 1996; Arneson 1997; Roemer 1998; Anderson 1999); and fourthly, the implications for distribution of giving primacy to libertarian principles (Locke 1773; Nozick 1974)⁴.

The first approach, derives from a conception of common humanity. As Kant states, any human ‘possesses a dignity (an absolute inner worth) by which he exacts respect from all other rational beings in the world, can measure himself with every other of this kind and *value himself on a footing of equality*’ (Kant, *Metaphysik der Sitten*: 1786: 435). The basis of the Human Rights Human Rights approach to development, similarly, is the view that every person is morally equal and

³ Intuitionists argue that moral principles are based on individual intuitions of what is right, and consequently not subject to considered reasoning – Moore, G. E. (1903). *Principia Ethica*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, *ibid*.

⁴ Locke and Kant could also, of course, be placed in the contractarian category.

consequently entitled to certain basic rights. ‘All humans are born free and equal in dignity and rights’ (1948 *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*).

This clearly implies some type of egalitarianism, yet not necessarily in terms of resource distribution. For Kant, every human should receive equality of ‘respect’: ‘treat humanity... in every case as an end, never as a means’. The distribution of material resources clearly has relevance to equality of respect since gross inequalities of wealth tend to be associated with inequality of respect: wealthy people frequently treat others as of a lower order, and their wealth enables them to order poorer members of society around including commanding their labour. Hence treating people as ends, never as means, does have egalitarian *material* content, although it clearly need not involve complete equality.

Others who have started from a Kantian position of common humanity, ‘moral capacity’ or ‘dignity’ (Williams 1962; Anderson 1999) conclude that it implies that everyone should have access to basic needs goods and services, in line with the basic needs approach to development ((ILO 1976; Streeten, Burki et al. 1981; Stewart 1985), but this could be consistent with (some) inequality in non-basic goods and services. For example, Williams argues that any difference in treatment of people must have justification and relevance: goods intended to meet *needs* (exemplified by illness (the need) and medical treatment (the good)) should be distributed according to need. In contrast, other goods are *merited*, (exemplified by the capacity to benefit from university education (the merit) and university education (the good)) and these, according to Williams, should be distributed according to *equality of opportunity*. Williams ‘needs’ goods might be interpreted as supporting a basic needs approach, while the ‘merit’ part could be interpreted as broadly equivalent to Roemer’s equality of opportunity (to be discussed below). Anderson takes a similar position, interpreting the material implications of treating people with dignity as involving comprehensive access to a minimum basket of basic goods and services. The human rights approach has also mostly been interpreted as requiring equality in access to certain basic goods.

How much inequality is consistent with equality of respect may vary across cultures. Light could be shed on this by empirical investigations into the determinants of respect for others. Group inequality – for example across race or gender – is likely to be a particularly strong source of disrespect since there is an inclination to argue that ‘you are poor because you are black/indigenous/female’ with the implication that the poorer group has inferior capacities.

A second philosophical approach derives the principles of distribution from a social contract (Rousseau 1968 (first edition 1762); Rawls 1971). In the first instance, social contract theory relates to individuals rather than groups. Rousseau argued that the social contract establishes 'equality among citizens' because 'they all pledge themselves under the same conditions and all enjoy the same rights', and his interpretation of this was that 'no citizen shall be rich enough to buy another and none so poor as to be forced to sell himself' ((Rousseau 1968 (first edition 1762)): 96). This is a potentially highly egalitarian conclusion if interpreted as ruling out wage labour. Rawls provides a more rigorous and detailed interpretation of distributional principles derived from a social contract, drawn up under a 'veil of ignorance'. The first Rawlsian principle is a form of equality in political space, i.e. that everyone should have basic liberties, such as political liberty, freedom of speech etc. The second - the difference or maximin principle - is 'that social and economic inequalities, for example inequalities of wealth and authority, are just only if they result in compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged members of society' (Rawls 2002)14-15.)

Accordingly, equality of material resource distribution is just, *unless it can be shown that the position of the poorest would be better in an unequal situation*, which would only occur if inequality raised growth to such an extent that the poor received more than in an equal situation. Whether inequality does indeed improve the position of the poorest, and how much inequality is optimal, is an empirical issue which may differ across contexts. For individuals, incentives may be needed to get them to work hard, use their talents to the full etc. so some vertical inequality may improve total output and, depending on how this is distributed, the position of the poorest. The same argument may apply *within* groups, justifying some intra-group inequality. But there is no reason why this should require significant *inter-group* inequality – it would do so only if it were the case that there were systematic differences across groups in talents and propensity to work, and there seems no reason why this should be the case. However, long-run historic disadvantage may reduce the relative productivity of some groups (e.g. because of educational and nutritional disadvantages).. In such a case, short-run output maximisation might involve some group inequalities, but whether maximin would also do so depends on whether the deprived groups receive a share of the benefits from the growth, which they might not (or only a small share) given long run discrimination. Consequently, the maximin principle is likely to lead to less HI, in the short run, than VI, and in the long-run anti-discrimination practices should eliminate any H as people in the previously deprived groups catch up in terms of potential productivity. These efficiency

arguments for inequality are much the same as those put forward by economists and are considered further below. But economists don't generally require that the poorest gain from inequality as with maximin

Thirdly, we consider 'luck egalitarianism', the fundamental premise of which is that people should not suffer advantage or disadvantage from elements outside their own control (Dworkin 1981) (Paes de Barros, Ferreira et al. 2009) (Roemer 1998)). In other words, inequality is justified if and only if it results from a person's own choices – e.g. with respect to work or lifestyle (or from luck). Since many salient identities, such as race, gender, place of birth and family background, constitute circumstances outside people's control, the principle would seem to eliminate most HI except to the extent that there are freely chosen cultural differences leading some groups to behave differently and thereby to gain more or less material advantage. Most of such cultural differences seem likely to be due to historical circumstances – not in the control of the individual. But some may be due to differences in preferences – for example, women might give priority to supporting the family rather than advancing in a career; and some religious orders – for example, some orthodox Jews – give priority to praying and reading religious scripts over economic activities. In Israel this has resulted in significant HIs between orthodox Jews and the rest of the population. From a luck egalitarianism perspective, only genuine differences in group preferences would justify HIs. And any apparent differences in group preferences need to be treated with caution, since they may be determined by historical/cultural influences over which individuals have little or no control. This arguably is the case for both the examples above.

Finally, the Locke/Nozick approach is concerned with *just processes*. This is potentially the most inegalitarian of the approaches considered since for both Locke and Nozick just outcomes are the outcomes that result from just processes which may be consistent with considerable inequality. For Locke, property is a natural right, so long as it is acquired by a person's own labour.⁵ Nozick drops the direct link with a person's labour, and argues that just outcomes are those that result from *legitimate acquisition* and *transfer* of goods and services. Since he interprets

⁵ Locke, J. (1963). Two Treatises of Government. [S.l.], New American Library. Locke presents two qualifications which heavily restrict its inegalitarian implications: first, that a person should have only as much as can be used before it spoils (the egalitarian consequences of this is, of course, much weakened by the advent of the refrigerator and freezer); and secondly, one must leave "enough and as good for others". Interpreting Locke's principle becomes complicated if production involves machinery. Although it is normal regarded as justifying property ownership and inequality, Locke's views can also be interpreted as being redistributory, involving a labour-theory of value and ownership rights. Vaughan, K. (1978). "John Locke and the Labor Theory of Value." Journal of Libertarian Studies 2 (4): 311-326 .

legitimate transfer to include bequests, any inequality, which may emerge, even from an equal starting point, can lead to considerable and rising, yet just, inequality. Instrumental consequences of such inequality are not considered relevant. However, there is one major exception to this unconstrained situation. This is the principle of *rectification* which ‘comes into play’ if resources are not obtained legitimately. As Nozick accepts: ‘Some people steal from others, or defraud them, or enslave them’ (Nozick :152). Where the resources were not acquired legitimately, including where inherited resources stem from illegitimate acquisition, ‘rectification’ (i.e. redistribution), is justified according to Nozick. How far this justifies redistribution depends on the interpretation of ‘legitimate acquisition’. If one includes resources obtained by force, corrupt practices, and so on, the principle of rectification could apply extensively thereby substantially modifying the egalitarian conclusions of this approach. This is particularly so for HI, since much group inequality stems from unjust treatment at some prior (and often current) time: indigenous peoples generally had their lands taken from them; blacks in the US were slaves; poorer groups in many African countries were discriminated against by the colonial authorities and again by post-colonial governments; women as a group have been oppressed for millennia, often treated as near-slaves, forbidden property rights etc. These injustices may no longer exist (or exist only partially), but Nozick’s principle of rectification still applies because many of those who are now privileged inherited some or all of their privilege from people in previous generations who did not acquire their initial resources legitimately. There is a general presumption, indeed, that this is the case with *all* inequalities between sizeable groups because why otherwise would they be unequal?

In sum, with the exception of Nozick, the philosophers reviewed here provide little justification for horizontal inequality. Equality of human dignity and respect would seem to limit HI since inequality between groups is often a major source of disrespect to members of the disadvantaged group. Rawls’ maximin principle is not likely to justify significant group inequality because it is unlikely that output would be significantly greater in the presence of group inequality – given broad equality in the distribution of talent and character across groups. Moreover, it is unlikely that the poor group would benefit much from any output gains resulting from inequality, since the poorer group(s) often experience discrimination and interlocking disadvantages which limits ‘trickle down’ so that output gains resulting from HIs may not benefit the poorest as required by maximin (Tilly 1998; Stewart and Langer 2008; Thorp and Paredes 2010). Luck egalitarianism also rules out most HI since inequality is not justified if it involves circumstances beyond the individual’s control and most identity differences are, indeed, beyond the individual’s control.

Moreover, while Nozick is generally thought of as justifying inequality, his principle of rectification is likely to apply to much group inequality, since so much of it has its origin in illegitimate processes.

Economists and inequality

Economists' views of distribution today are generally much more instrumental than philosophers, investigating which distribution best maximises chosen objectives - primarily efficiency and economic growth. But this was not always so. Utilitarianism which forms the basis of much of economics implies that the extent of inequality should depend on which distribution maximises utility. Pigou argued that this led to a highly egalitarian conclusion since he assumed that a person's marginal utility would diminish as they acquired more of it (Pigou 1920). However, this assumption was famously disputed by Robbins who asserted that one cannot compare the utility gained by different individuals on the basis that: 'in our hearts we do not regard different men's satisfactions from similar means as equally valuable' (Robbins 1945): 156-7); (Robbins 1938). Robbins' argument was widely accepted and economists since then have mainly shied away from making judgements about the desirable degree of inequality except from an instrumental perspective. This view was reinforced by those economists, such as (Hayek 1944), with libertarian views about the undesirability of restraints on individual actions.

Nonetheless, economists accept that there are instrumental considerations influencing the desirable distribution, with the optimal distribution being that which would maximise efficiency and output. A certain amount of vertical inequality may be needed, for example, to encourage people to work hard, use their talents and direct their energies in a way that exploits their comparative advantage and maximises societal output. In addition, it is sometimes argued that unequal income distribution increases savings. On the other hand, there is also an efficiency case *against* too much inequality – since it can reduce societal human capital, as poorer people are likely be more undernourished and undereducated (Gutiérrez and Tanaka 2009), while highly unequal income distribution may reduce the size of domestic markets (leading to under-consumption and unemployment, though there are ways, of course, of compensating for this). Moreover, inequality has been argued to be a cause of economic instability (Lansley 2011; Stiglitz 2012). Thus there are efficiency arguments both for and against vertical inequality.

One plausible conclusion from economists' instrumentalism is that the objective should not be *equality of outcomes* but *equality of opportunities* since in principle one would expect efficiency to be

maximised if everyone faces the same opportunities. Yet equality of opportunities can be interpreted in different ways. On the one hand, it may be the same as luck egalitarianism, i.e. ruling out inequalities which arise from circumstances beyond the control of the individual. As noted above this leads to a pretty egalitarian conclusion, especially in relation to HIs, and would require considerable intervention in market outcomes, given the long-term historic disadvantages suffered by many groups (ethnic, female, racial, for example). Yet this might well not be the output maximizing position in the short to medium term. On the other hand, a more limited interpretation of equal opportunities is that no one suffers *contemporary* discrimination: for given qualifications and capacities each faces the same opportunity. This is more likely to be the short-run output maximising position, but it would leave considerable inequalities, since people have historic disadvantages that prevent them from having equal qualifications and capacities.

Like those of philosophers, the views of economists lead to more egalitarian conclusions in relation to groups than individuals. First, while Robbins statement about how different people may get different satisfaction from the same income might be justified in relation to individuals, it is very difficult to argue that a particular gender or racial or ethnic group as a whole gets more (or less) satisfaction from a given amount of income than another. Secondly, the efficiency arguments suggest elimination of discrimination, which should eventually mean equality between groups, especially if interpreted in a broad way to eliminate historic sources of disadvantage.⁶ In addition, there are efficiency arguments in relation to investments in health, education and nutrition – since more egalitarian distributions are generally associated with more equal distributions. These considerations apply equally to VI and HI.

When it comes to arguments based on efficiency, empirical evidence is needed as to how distribution affects efficiency. This issue has been fairly thoroughly investigated in relation to VI, testing, on the one hand, whether (Galenson and Leibenstein 1955)'s argument that more inequality would generate additional savings to finance investment and thereby promote economic growth, or (Okun 1975)'s argument that inequality promotes growth through its effect on incentives; and, on the other hand, the argument of (Adelman and Morris 1973) that more

⁶ It is worth drawing attention to an interesting similarity and contrast between the efficiency arguments of economists and those of philosophers (notably Rawls). Rawls starts with the presumption that equality is desirable but that *inequality* may be justified if it serves, instrumentally via efficiency effects, to improve the position of the *poorest* compared with an egalitarian situation. Economists, in contrast, argue that greater *equality* may be justified (compared with a market outcome) if it serves to improve the position of at least one person and not to worsen that of any other – or (allowing for compensation) if it raises national income -without regard to the consequences for the poorest.

equality will promote growth by raising investment in human resources.⁷ A somewhat mixed picture has emerged from the empirical research, depending on whether cross-country or panel data is used (Alesina and Perotti 1994; Alesina and Rodrik 1994; Persson, Tabellini et al. 1994; Bénabou 1996) (Li and Zou 1998) and (Forbes 2000) (Banerjee and Duflo 2003) (Fishlow 1995) (Panizza 1999). However, a recent study by two economists at the IMF found that ‘when growth is looked at over the long term, the trade-off between efficiency and equality may not exist. In fact equality appears to be important in promoting and sustaining growth’ (Berg and Ostry 2011): 13).⁸

These studies investigate the connection between VI and economic growth. There is almost no systematic evidence on HIs and economic growth. Because of the multiplicity of ways of categorizing people into groups and data constraints, this is a difficult issue to investigate. A priori arguments might suggest that more equality would be growth promoting because the playing field is more level and more of the population’s potential is being used. Country studies give a mixed picture (Stewart 2013).

However, one area where there is systematic evidence concerns the relationship between HIs and violent conflict.⁹ Research indicates that HIs are particularly likely to provoke conflict where there are both economic and political inequalities simultaneously in the same direction (Stewart

⁷ Considerable evidence shows that higher income inequality leads to worse outcomes in education Mayer, S. E. (2000). *Income Inequality, Economic Segregation and Children's Educational Attainment*. *JCPR Working Papers*. Chicago, Northwestern University/University of Chicago Joint Center for Poverty Research. (Meyer 2001), health and nutrition Hildebrand, V. and P. Van Kerm (2009). "Income inequality and self-rated health status: evidence from the European Community Household Panel." *Demography* 46(4): 805-825. (Hildebrand and Van Kerm 2009, Kondo et al 2009), and that this in turn is likely to reduce growth Birdsall, N. and R. Sabot (1994). *Inequality as a Constraint on Growth in Latin America*. *Development Policy Review*. Washington, DC, Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). (Birdsall and Sabot, 1994; Ranis, G., F. Stewart, et al. (2000). "Economic Growth and Human Development." *World Development* 28(2): 197-220.).

⁸ The relationship between inequality and growth may vary according to the level of inequality. Cornia, G. A. (2004). *Inequality, growth, and poverty in an era of liberalization and globalization*. Oxford, Oxford University Press. plotted inequality against growth of GDP per capita for 1960-1998, showing a concave relationship with growth rising as inequality increases from very low levels, and then declining with a further increase in inequality.

⁹ On balance the evidence does not support a connection between VI and civil war Fearon, J. D. and D. D. Laitin (2003). *Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War*, Cambridge Journals Online. 97: 75-90, Collier, P. and A. Hoeffler (2004). "Greed and Grievance in Civil War." *Oxford Economic Papers* 56: 563-595., although Auvinen, J. and E. W. Nafziger (1999). "The sources of humanitarian emergencies." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 43(3): 267-290. found a weak connection. This is because people mobilise behind a common identity (often ethnicity or religion) and such mobilisation can be stimulated by sharp HIs. There is less potential for mobilisation with high VI, but there are peasants and caste movements which unify and mobilise the deprived.

2008, Cederman et al 2011, Ostby 2008), since in those circumstances leaders have an incentive to mobilise, because of political exclusion while socio-economic inequalities provide an incentive for people to mobilise. Inequalities in cultural recognition can also provoke conflict (Langer and Brown 2008). There is also evidence that horizontal inequalities are associated with other forms of group violence, including milder types such as riots (Blau and Blau 1982) and horrendous forms like genocide (Fein 1993, Harff 2003, Stewart 2011). Some work too links gender inequality to domestic violence (Bailey and Peterson 1995, Yodanis 2004).

The mounting evidence that HIs are associated with the outbreak of conflict constitutes a powerful reason for aiming to reduce such inequalities, since violent conflict has heavy human and economic costs, including strong adverse effects on economic growth (Fitzgerald 1987; Collier 1999; Stewart 2001).

This section of the paper has argued that there are powerful reasons for reducing HIs: on the one hand, in general such inequalities are unjust; secondly, they are likely to be an obstacle to efficiency; and thirdly, they raise the risk of conflict with heavy human and economic costs. The empirical work on HIs has been largely confined to intra-national HIs. The next section of the paper will present an important global example, that is the situation of Muslims versus non-Muslims in the world today.

It is, of course, a big jump from thinking about intra-national inequalities to thinking about international ones. Most of the philosophers approaches relate to inequalities *within* a nation. Rawls is explicit on this, arguing that a social contract can only occur among people who are roughly equal, while the contract requires a state to act to bring about justice. Neither of these conditions is present globally. (Walzer 1983) too confines his sphere of justice to people living in the same geographic space. Work stemming from the idea aiming for equality of opportunities has also measured within nation inequalities. Empirical investigations of the relationship between inequality and growth, and HIs and conflict, have also all been within nation. (Paes de Barros, Ferreira et al. 2009). (Milanovic 2005) is unusual in measuring vertical inequality at a global level. Consistent with this, , a Kantian or Human Rights approach treats everyone as equal, irrespective of their nationality, and this is the perspective I adopt. But one needs to make a bold assumption that national findings apply internationally, on the implications of inequality for economic efficiency and growth and for conflict. The evidence below on Muslim –non-Muslim inequalities reports on both intra and international inequalities.

3. Muslims versus non-Muslims: a global example of HIs

The relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims represents one of the major global tensions in the contemporary world, erupting into a variety of types of violence – including 9/11 and the July 2007 London bombs; a range of terrorist incidents and threats; conflicts within African countries, such as in Mali and Niger; and Western armed interventions in a number of countries, including Iraq, Afghanistan, and Mali, and others indirectly, such as Somalia.

This section reports on pervasive HIs between Muslims and non-Muslims, both within countries and between them, which underlie some of these tensions. However, Muslims are by no means a unitary homogeneous community, but themselves have many divisions and tensions, some of which are violent, for example between Shias and Sunnis in various Middle Eastern countries. Thus it is a gross oversimplification to regard Muslims world-wide as an undifferentiated whole. Yet, despite divisions, there do seem to be strong global connections and an overarching identity. Evidence on this is presented at the end of the section. First, I report on pervasive inequalities, starting with national inequalities, before moving onto international ones.

3.1 *National Inequalities in Europe, Asia and Africa.*

a. *Europe*

Investigation of three countries – the Netherlands, France and the UK – illustrates the multiple inequalities Muslims face in Europe. Similar evidence is available for other European countries. With the exception of small historical enclaves such as the Bosniaks, Muslims in developed countries mainly consist of fairly recent immigrants – from North Africa in the case of France; from Turkey in the case of Germany; from Bangladesh and Pakistan in the UK; and some combination in most other European countries.

Muslims in the Netherlands, mostly of Moroccan or Turkish and, to a lesser extent, Indonesian origin, form about 6 per cent of the total population. In France there is little hard data available because of the government's decision to deny all such group categorisation in data collection. However, piecemeal evidence suggests that Muslims in France account for perhaps 4 million people, also around 6 per cent of the total population. The Muslim population in the United Kingdom is smaller, accounting for around 2 per cent of the total population in 2001.

Extensive evidence shows that socio-economic HIs disadvantage Muslims across multiple dimensions – including housing, education, employment and incomes. In each country, most

Muslims live in low-income areas of major cities. In the Netherlands, more than half of Turks and more than 60 per cent of Moroccans have an unskilled job, compared with less than 30 per cent of native Dutch. There is evidence of discrimination in the labour market and the educational system (SCP 2005). The incomes of Moroccan men are 42 per cent below those of the native Dutch, and those of Turkish men are 34 per cent below. Poverty rates among the elderly are substantially higher than for native Dutch (Demant, Maussen et al. 2007). Education levels are significantly lower for the Muslim community – 40 per cent of Turks and 45 per cent of Moroccans have had no more than primary education and drop-out rates are higher (Demant, Maussen et al. 2007).

In France, educational attainments are also worse for the Muslim population than for the native population, with more repeat years, higher drop-out rates, lower attainments in examinations, less attendance at high school, and fewer diplomas. French Muslims are more likely to be unemployed and experience more difficulties in finding long-term full-time employment than native French (Viprey 2002).

In Britain, deprivations have been extensively documented by the Equalities Commission Review (EqualitiesCommission 2007). As they state: ‘Muslims account for a disproportionate number of people living in areas of multiple deprivation: more than two in three Bangladeshis and more than half of all Pakistanis live in areas in the bottom decile for deprivation.’ (Equalities Commission 2007: 35). In more detail, the (EqualitiesCommission 2006): 25) notes that the net earnings of Bangladeshi males were reported as just half those of white males and deprivation is evident at every level of education. For example, Pakistani and Bangladeshi rates of attainments in language and literacy at an early age were 57 per cent of those of whites; their achievement of 5-GCSEs was three quarters of that of whites for boys and a bit higher for girls; and they were underrepresented in higher education, although there is evidence of some catch-up in recent years (Sefton and Stewart 2009). Disadvantages are also reported with respect to health (Equalities Review 2006).

There is cultural discrimination in each of the countries, with dress being a particular issue. For example, within schools in the Netherlands there are frequent complaints about dress, especially the wearing of hijab. In France, too, the issue of the headscarf has created periodic controversy with children expelled from school for wearing them. There is less controversy on this in Britain, however. In all three countries, national holidays are Christian or secular, and there are no Muslim

holidays. There has been periodic cultural controversy – notably in the Netherlands with the murder of Theo van Gogh in 2004, who was making a film attacking Muslim practices.

Political inequalities are also in evidence, though less in the Netherlands with Muslims broadly proportionately represented in parliament and the cabinet, although underrepresented in the police. In 2005 only 6 per cent of the police in major cities had an immigrant background, although they account for about 30 per cent of the population there ((Demant, Maussen et al. 2007)). In France, four members of the Senate who were Muslims in 2010 or just over 1 per cent of the Senate. At the cabinet level, the first Muslim minister was appointed in 2005 and three were appointed by Sarkozy. In the UK, after the 2009 elections there were four Muslim MPs, or around 0.6 per cent of the total. The first Muslim cabinet minister was appointed in 2010, and Muslims are underrepresented in the judiciary and legal system(Herding 2012).

While only three countries in Europe are discussed here, similar findings would emerge from other European countries, such as Germany, with its large and underprivileged Turkish population, and Denmark where the Muslim population has been subject to attack from the infamous cartoons, which reflect a strong anti-Muslim strand in the Danish population. However, in policy terms, a noteworthy exception is the Spanish Zapatero government which ‘granted amnesty to a swathe of illegal (mainly Moroccan) immigrants in 2004 shortly after his election and the Madrid bombings’.¹⁰

b. HIs faced by Muslim communities in Asia

Where Muslims account for almost the entire population (Bangladesh and Pakistan), the issue of HIs with non-Muslims does not arise and these countries are not considered further here. Where Muslims are in a majority, as in Indonesia and Malaysia, political dominance can be used to advance their socio-economic position. The most problematic situation is where Muslims are in a minority and suffer consistent HIs across political, socio-economic and cultural status dimensions.

Malaysia: In Malaysia, the majority of people are Muslim (the Malay community and other indigenous groups) and account for around two-thirds of the population, while the Chinese (24 per cent of the population) are mostly either Christian or Buddhist, and the Indian population (6.5 per cent) mainly Hindus with sizeable Muslim and Christian minorities. Severe inequalities

¹⁰ Personal communication from Mansoob Murshed.

present when Malaysia became independent, with the Chinese far richer than Malays, have been partially corrected by comprehensive policies since the 1970s. Yet economic inequalities favouring non-Muslims persist with significant differences in average incomes (Figure 1). Politically and culturally, however, Muslims dominate.




Figure One: HIs in Malaysia

Indonesia: In Indonesia, Muslims account for over 84 per cent of the population, with most of the remainder Christian according to the 2000 census. On average Muslim incomes are substantially below all other groups, apart from the small Hindu population (Table 1). Given the political and demographic dominance of Muslims, these differences are normally not provocative – although there were attacks on the Christian Chinese during economic crisis (in the late 1990s). While Muslims have been politically dominant at the national level, in some areas of the archipelago where colonial Christianization took hold more strongly, Christian groups have dominated historically. Amid rapid and extensive decentralisation in the post-Suharto era, competition for political and economic power at the local level fed into extensive Christian/Muslim violence in Ambon, North Maluku, and Central Sulawesi (which also involved ethnic differences).

Table 1: Income HIs in Indonesia

	Share of population, %	Ratio of income per capita to Muslim income
Muslims	83.6	1 [1.04]
Catholics	7.6	1.58 [1.29]
Protestants	4.2	1.50 [1.25]
Hindus	3.0	0.97 [1.17]
Buddhists	1.3	1.61 [0.93]

Source: Calculated from the 1995 Inter-Censal Survey (SUPAS) data

Bracketted figures = coefficient of variation

India: The Muslim population in India, which accounted for 13.4 per cent of the Indian population in 2001, is on average systematically worse off than the Hindu population. Educational differences between Muslims and Hindus in India persisted throughout the twentieth century (Deolalikar 2008). Muslim literacy rates in 2001 were 59 per cent compared with an all India rate of 65 per cent.¹¹ Overall Muslims are more likely to be engaged in self-employment and much less likely to have regular salaried jobs, especially in the government or large public and private sector enterprises (GovernmentIndia 2006). Muslim regular employees receive lower daily salary earnings in both public sector and private sector jobs (GovernmentIndia 2006). Muslims and Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes have been persistently the most disadvantaged groups in terms of headcount poverty. In 2004-5, for example, the Muslim poverty rate was 43 per cent compared with a rate of 27 per cent for all Hindus.

There is abundant evidence of political inequalities between Muslims and Hindus in India. In the Indian parliament, the Lok Sabha, Muslim representation was 6.6 per cent in 2004 (Ansari 2006), in comparison with a population share of over 13 per cent. There was also underrepresentation in State Assemblies (Ansari 2006). There have been periodic attacks and counter-attacks between Muslims and Hindus, sometimes triggered by demolition of religious buildings, for example, the demolition of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya in 1992.

¹¹ Scheduled castes and tribes – among the Hindus – also face multiple deprivations and are generally worse off than Muslims as a group (Government of India 2006).

China: There is very little data on the socio-economic position of Muslims in China who account for an estimated 1-2 per cent of the total population or around 20 million people, in several ethnic groups, including Hui (largely Mandarin speaking), and Dongxiang and Uigur (Turkic speaking). Data are only available for educational performance, which shows varying disadvantage among ethnic groups (Fisher 2004)

Philippines and Thailand: There are strong similarities between the Philippines and Thailand regarding the position of Muslims relative to the rest of the population. In both countries, Muslims are doubly disadvantaged: first, the regions in which they are located have lower per capita incomes (and growth rates) than the rest of the country; and second, within the region of concentration, the Muslim population does less well than the rest of the population (Brown 2008).

Muslims in the Philippines account for about 5 per cent of the total population, but a much larger proportion in Mindanao region – around 20 per cent today (a sharp drop over the last hundred years largely due to immigration from the rest of the Philippines, encouraged by the state). Mindanao as a whole has been consistently below the national average in terms of GDP per capita. Within Mindanao, the socio-economic performance of the five provinces in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARRM) is worst of all the Philippines (Brown 2008).

Likewise, in Thailand, the Muslim population forms a small proportion of the total Thai population (4.6 per cent), but a much larger proportion in the southern region (28 per cent in 2000) (data from CIA and Brown 2008), which shows the lowest economic performance in the country. Within Southern Thailand, Muslims are disadvantaged relative to the Buddhist majority. For example, in 1987 (the only year for which there are data of this kind), Buddhist males had 1.68 times the number of years education of Muslim males, and the discrepancy in household assets was 1.17 (Brown 2008: 273).

In both the Philippines and Thailand, there has been violent opposition from Muslim groups, seeking greater political autonomy for their region– the violence has been greater in the Philippines, and more sporadic in Thailand.

c. Muslim/non-Muslim HIs in West Africa

In West Africa too, the demographic position of Muslims varies. In some countries (Benin, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana) Muslims form a significant minority; in Nigeria they account for about half the population; and in Niger and Mali they dominate the population. In general Muslims are concentrated in the north of each country, so that data on regional inequalities gives some guide to their relative position.

In the case of Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria, all socio-economic indicators are worse in the north of the country where Muslims are concentrated. For Benin, while education indicators (literacy and school attendance) are worse than the national average in all four northern regions, and income per head is worse in three, life expectancy is as good or better, possibly reflecting lower rates of HIV/AIDS among Muslim populations. Data on height differences show northern disadvantage in Cameroon, Chad and Côte d'Ivoire (Moradi and Baten 2005).

While there is generally economic and social disadvantage among Muslims, the situation with respect to political and cultural status varies markedly with demography as well as national attitudes and practices. In the majority states, Muslim cultural and political status is generally good. But there is considerable variation elsewhere. For example, in Ghana there is a culture of inclusion both politically and in relation to general status, but in Côte d'Ivoire, Northerners have been excluded politically and culturally – indeed this is thought to be a major reason for the outbreak of civil war in 2002 (Langer 2005).

d. Israel and Palestine.

Within Israel there are large inequalities between Jews and Muslims, starting with citizenship rights. Poverty rates are far higher among the Arab population (60% compared with 20% for all Israel). Unemployment rate in 2008 were 11% among Arabs compared with 7% for all Israel. Arab students receive one third the amount of funding per student as Jewish students. The Arab IMR is twice the Jewish rate, and life expectancy among Arabs is four years less than Jews. Even stronger than these inequalities within Israel are inequalities between Israelis and Palestinians:

	Israel	Palestine	Ratio I/P
GNI per capita, PPP 2009, \$	25,849	2,656	9.73
GDP p. capita growth rate, 2000-2009	2.1%	- 2.1%	
Telephone lines per 100, 2009	45.7	9.4	4.9
Unemployment rate, 2009	7.5%	24.9%	0.30
IMR, 2010	3.7	20.2	0.18

Table 2: Israel/Palestine HIs.

Source: World Bank: World Development Indicators

3.2 *Inequalities between countries*

The evidence shows systematic HIs in which Muslims are relatively deprived within countries in much of the world. There is also evidence that Muslim countries (those where Muslims form the majority) are less well off at a global level than non-Muslim ones, in socio-economic, cultural and political terms.

If we take all countries in which Muslims dominate and contrast them with all countries where other religions (or non-religions) dominate, including Christians, Hindus, Buddhists and secularists, there is a clear and large gap favouring non-Muslims, although there are, of course, very big differences within each of these categories: for example, many poor countries are in the non-Muslim group (such as Malawi, Nepal, and Bolivia); and there are some economically successful countries in the Muslim group, such as Malaysia, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. This is illustrated by Figure Two showing the proportions of Muslim and non-Muslim countries in high, middle and low Human development categories, according to the UNDP.




Figure Two: Human Development in Muslim and non-Muslim Countries

Average per capita incomes of the states where a majority of the population is Muslim are just 44 per cent of those of the non-Muslim countries, and under-five mortality rates are almost twice as high (Table 3), with considerable heterogeneity in each group. There is also a clear imbalance in political power. As indicators of this, Table 9 shows how much greater non-Muslim countries' power is by comparing membership of the Security Council, voting rights at the IMF, and military expenditure. By each measure, the Muslim countries fall well below the non-Muslim, including when calculating these in relation to population shares, or numbers of countries.

Table 3: Comparative performance of Muslim and non-Muslim countries

Muslim countries ^a , average ^b performance	Non-Muslim countries average performance	Ratio of Muslim to non-Muslim
200 [89.5]	105 [81.5]	1.9
100 [80.3]	46 [55.5]	2.18
0.1 [2.4]	1.5 [2.3]	0.07
5,470 [6,493]	12,497 12,019]	0.44
3/17 (no permanent)	12/17 (including all permanent)	0.25
0.12	0.16	0.75
0.09	0.18	0.5
11.8	88.2	0.13
0.47	1.18	0.4
7.7%	92.3%	0.08
0.31	1.23	0.25

Source: UNDP, Human Development Report statistics; IMF: <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.htm>. UN Security Council: <http://www.un.org/sc/members.asp>; Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_military_expenditures

- a. Defined as any country with 50% or more of population classified as Muslim according to CIA FactBook. Standard
- b. Country averages, not weighted by population.
- c. deviations are in square brackets.


4. *Implications of consistent and persistent global inequalities*

As indicated above, there is evidence of consistent deprivation of Muslims relative to others globally, within *and* between countries. Within particular countries, such inequalities can (and often do) underlie group mobilisation, sometimes leading to violence, which can take the form of local disputes and violence (as in Indonesia and Nigeria), riots (as in India), or national conflict (as in Cote d'Ivoire). It seems plausible that the global inequalities underlie some of the current global tensions leading to global terrorism. Yet this depends on there being strong connections among Muslims globally.

There is extensive evidence of global connections between Muslims across the world (Stewart 2009). Some of the major connections are illustrated in Figure 3. They include family connections, involving a range of communications, marriages, and remittances; education and training, for which people travel globally to Asia, the Middle East and to Europe to attend a variety of educational institutions; financial connections (outside the family), with finance (and aid) crossing borders, much going from the Middle East, notably Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, to developing countries; the Hajj pilgrimage which takes millions to Mecca; global civil (including religious) and political institutions; and, more recently, media and internet connections. While all these connections enhance a shared Muslim identity, the connections are multilayered, and the links occur among different groups of people, according to context – including importantly, differences among religious subsets of Islam (Sunnis, Shia, different *madhabs* within them, Sufism and different Sufi orders, liberals and radicals, and so on)¹² as well as differences in economic activities and interests, needs and education. The connections are neither unidirectional nor monolithic. Nonetheless, together the links are very large in number, some of which touch most Muslims in one way or another.

¹² See, for example, Sivan, E. (2003). "The clash within Islam." *Survival* 45(1): 24-44.who discusses the divisions between radical Islam and liberals.

Figure Three: Some global connections among Muslims



An example of some of the multiple connections is provided in an article by Tahir Abbas (2007), himself a British Muslim, who interviews Moazzam Begg, a second generation British Muslim with a middle class background, who had been detained in Guantanamo Bay. Abbas (2007: 430) attributes Begg's radicalism to 'exclusion, marginalisation, disempowerment, media bias, political rhetoric, far right hostility, perceptions in relation to British and US foreign policy, a lack of appropriate Muslim leadership in Britain and a regressive interpretation of Islam as a reactive rather than a pro-active experience'. Inspired by a film, *The Message*, and facing racism in Birmingham, Moazzam began to look to Islam 'to get rid of the cultural baggage'. He met Bosnian Muslims, blond and blue-eyed and 'felt a great affinity towards them' (Abbas 2007: 432-3). In the 1990s he made eight or nine trips to Bosnia and made financial donations to the Bosnian army. After his bookshop was raided by MI5 and he had married a Pakistani woman, he moved to Afghanistan and financed and built a school, shortly before 9/11. When asked about the London bombings, he felt 'The targeting of individual is wrong and it shouldn't happen...The overriding factor of the occupation in Iraq and Afghanistan was enough to spur them on to do what they did...it was this idea that it is all one and the same: the struggle in Afghanistan and Iraq and even Britain, that it's all connected.' (Abbas, 2007: 436).

This view- that it's all connected, was also clearly expressed by one of the Nigerian Muslim fighters: 'The presence of France [in Mali] has launched a war on Islam and we are fighting it everywhere' (Boko Haram Islamists (Nigeria), quoted in *Financial Times*, February 25th 2013).

These manifold global connections linking Muslims across countries make it likely that grievances in one place will be felt elsewhere – 'it's all connected' as Moazzam stated. Pew surveys document the homogeneity of views among Muslims across countries among and the marked differences from non-Muslims (Pew Research Center 2006). In the 2006 survey, a high proportion of Muslims blamed Western people for poor relations between Muslims and the West, and the reverse was true of non-Muslims with a considerable proportion blaming Westerners. The difference was most marked among Nigerians: 69 per cent of Christian Nigerians blamed the Muslims and 10 per cent Western people, while in contrast only 1 per cent of Nigerian Muslims blamed Muslims and 83 per cent blamed Western people. Similar differences are shown on questions of responsibility for economic failures and cultural issues.

5. Conclusions

This paper has argued that most HIs are not only unjust but they also have some adverse effects, most clearly in provoking conflict between groups. Evidence has been provided showing systematic inequalities between Muslims and non-Muslims within most countries, apart from those where Muslims account for almost all the population, and between countries. It is suggested that these inequalities may be contributing to both national and international tensions, culminating in violence within countries and from time to time internationally too. This suggests that policies to support both justice and peace should be directed towards reducing these inequalities. Yet both within nations and between them, most policies are directed at repressing what are seen as extremists and terrorists rather than directing social, economic, cultural and political policies aimed at substantially reducing such inequalities. National policies to reduce Muslim-non-Muslim inequalities are needed within European countries as well as many developing countries. To date the need for such policies to reduce tensions and avoid the need for tough security measures has rarely been acknowledged, let alone acted upon. Yet evidence on the relationship between HIs and conflict suggests that without reducing such inequalities, repressive policies are likely to have only short-term effects in protecting national security.

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