

STATE OF INDIANA

INDIANA UTILITY REGULATORY COMMISSION

VERIFIED PETITION OF SOUTHERN INDIANA)
GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY D/B/A VECTREN)
ENERGY DELIVERY OF INDIANA, INC.)
REQUESTING THE INDIANA UTILITY)
REGULATORY COMMISSION TO APPROVE)
CERTAIN DEMAND SIDE MANAGEMENT)
PROGRAMS AND GRANT COMPANY) CAUSE NO. 44927
AUTHORITY TO RECOVER COSTS, INCLUDING)
PROGRAM COSTS, INCENTIVES AND LOST)
MARGINS, ASSOCIATED WITH THE DEMAND)
SIDE MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS VIA THE)
COMPANY'S DEMAND SIDE MANAGEMENT)
ADJUSTMENT)

DIRECT TESTIMONY AND EXHIBITS OF ELIZABETH A. STANTON, PHD,
ON BEHALF OF CITIZENS ACTION COALITION OF INDIANA, INC.

**Direct Testimony of Elizabeth A. Stanton, PhD
On Behalf of Citizens Action Coalition of Indiana, Inc.
Cause No. 44927
July 26, 2017**

1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 **Q. Please state your name and business address.**

3 **A.** My name is Elizabeth A. Stanton. I am the Director and Senior Economist of the
4 Applied Economics Clinic, a non-profit consulting group housed at Tufts
5 University.

6 **Q. Please describe the Applied Economics Clinic.**

7 **A.** The Applied Economics Clinic provides expert testimony, analysis, modeling,
8 policy briefs, and reports to public interest groups on the topics of environment,
9 consumer protection, and equity. The Clinic also serves to train the next
10 generation of expert technical witnesses and analysts by providing applied, on-
11 the-job training to graduate students in related fields and working proactively to
12 support diversity among both student workers and professional staff. The Applied
13 Economics Clinic began operations in February 2017.

14 **Q. Please describe your professional background and experience.**

15 **A.** I am a researcher and analyst with more than 16 years of professional experience
16 as a political and environmental economist. I have authored more than 120 reports,
17 policy studies, white papers, journal articles, and book chapters on topics related
18 to energy, the economy, and the environment.

19 In my previous position as a principal economist at Synapse Energy
20 Economics, I led studies examining environmental regulation, cost-benefit

1 analyses, and the economics of energy efficiency and renewable energy. I have
2 submitted expert testimony and comments in Illinois, Vermont, New Hampshire,
3 Massachusetts, and several federal dockets. My recent work includes extensive
4 analysis of the EPA's proposed Clean Power Plan, critiquing the analyses used to
5 support a flawed valuation method for nuclear power plants, developing
6 testimony on Global Warming Solutions Act (GWSA) compliance for the
7 Massachusetts Departments of Energy Resources and Environmental Protection,
8 and analysis of the need for new gas pipelines in New England and the U.S.
9 Southeast.

10 Prior to joining Synapse, I was a senior economist with the Stockholm
11 Environment Institute's (SEI) Climate Economics Group, where I was responsible
12 for leading the organization's work on the Consumption-Based Emissions
13 Inventory (CBEI) model and on water issues and climate change in the western
14 United States. While at SEI, I led domestic and international studies
15 commissioned by the United Nations Development Programme, Friends of the
16 Earth-U.K., and Environmental Defense.

17 My articles have been published in *Ecological Economics*, *Renewable*
18 *Climatic Change*, *Environmental and Resource Economics*, *Environmental*
19 *Science & Technology*, and other journals. I have also published books, including
20 *Climate Change and Global Equity* (Anthem Press, 2014) and *Climate*
21 *Economics: The State of the Art* (Routledge, 2013), which I co-wrote with Frank
22 Ackerman. I am also coauthor of *Environment for the People* (Political Economy
23 Research Institute, 2005, with James K. Boyce) and co-editor of *Reclaiming*

1 *Nature: Worldwide Strategies for Building Natural Assets* (Anthem Press, 2007,
2 with Boyce and Sunita Narain).

3 I earned my Ph.D. in economics at the University of Massachusetts-
4 Amherst, and have taught economics at Tufts University, the University of
5 Massachusetts-Amherst, and the College of New Rochelle, among others.

6 My professional resume is attached as Attachment EAS-1.

7 **Q. Have you testified previously before the Indiana Utility Regulatory**
8 **Commission (“Commission” or “IURC”)?**

9 **A.** Yes. I have submitted pre-filed testimony in the currently pending Cause Nos.
10 43955 DSM 4 (Duke 2018-2020 DSM) and 44872 (NIPSCO CCR).

11 **Q. On whose behalf are you testifying?**

12 **A.** I am testifying on behalf of Citizens Actions Coalition of Indiana, Inc. (“CAC”).

13 **Q. What is the purpose of your testimony?**

14 **A.** The purpose of my testimony is to provide my expert opinion as to whether or not
15 Southern Indiana Gas & Electric Company’s dba Vectren Energy Delivery’s
16 (“Vectren” or “the Company”) 2017-2019 energy efficiency plan meets the
17 definition of “energy efficiency goals” and is reasonable under Indiana Senate
18 Enrolled Act 412 (2015), which has been codified under Ind. Code § 8-1-8.5-10. I
19 have concluded Vectren’s plan should be rejected as unreasonable. It is my
20 opinion that Vectren’s 2016 IRP, including Vectren Witness Stevie’s inputs
21 provided for the IRP, does not provide an optimal balance of energy resources
22 that “can only result[] from a well-developed and reasoned IRP that evaluates the
23 appropriate balance of new supply-side and demand-side resources taking account

1 of risks and uncertainty.” Cause No. 43955 DSM 3, Final Order at 45; *see also*
2 Final Order, Cause No. 44634 at 34.

3 **Q. Are you submitting any attachments?**

4 **A.** Yes. Attachment EAS-2 is an update to the report written by myself and CAC
5 Witness Anna Sommer, which was previously submitted to the Commission
6 through the Vectren IRP stakeholder process on April 17, 2017.¹ This document is
7 now completely public. Our report comments on a 2015 working paper by
8 Richard Stevie entitled “Energy Efficiency Program Costs, Program Size, and
9 Market Penetration”² and debunks his claim that there is evidence of “higher
10 energy efficiency market penetration leading to higher efficiency costs.”³ Instead,
11 we show that there is no reliable evidence to support such a claim and that
12 “[i]mplementing Stevie’s suggestions would lead utilities to the selection of less
13 energy efficiency than is optimal.”⁴

14 **Q. Please summarize your conclusions and recommendations.**

15 **A.** Vectren’s 2016 IRP, specifically as it relates to DSM cost projections, depends
16 heavily on an analysis performed by Vectren Witness Stevie. Vectren Witness
17 Stevie’s projected increase in future energy efficiency costs is based on faulty
18 data, an incorrect interpretation of statistical results, and a deeply flawed
19 application of those results to predicted costs.

¹ The original submission can be found here as Attachment A:
[http://www.in.gov/iurc/files/Vectren%202016%20IRP--
Public%20Comments%20by%20CAC%20et%20al--4-17-17.pdf](http://www.in.gov/iurc/files/Vectren%202016%20IRP--Public%20Comments%20by%20CAC%20et%20al--4-17-17.pdf).

² Petitioner’s Exhibit No. 2, Attachment RGS-2.

³ Attachment EAS-2 at 1.

⁴ *Id.*

1 Because Vectren’s 2016 IRP depends so heavily on Vectren Witness
2 Stevie’s flawed cost projections, Vectren cannot demonstrate that its 2016 IRP
3 arrives at an optimal balance that “can only result[] from a well-developed and
4 reasoned IRP that evaluates the appropriate balance of new supply-side and
5 demand-side resources taking account of risks and uncertainty” pursuant to Ind.
6 Code § 8-1-8.5-10(c). Cause No. 43955 DSM 3, Final Order at 45; *see also* Final
7 Order, Cause No. 44634 at 34. I recommend against using these findings as they
8 are inadequate and unreasonable,⁵ given that (as Vectren Witness Stevie
9 acknowledges) no useable prediction of the impact of efficiency market
10 penetration on program costs exists. Instead, I suggest that the correct assumption
11 to use in IRP modeling is that inflation-adjusted efficiency costs remain constant
12 (in real, inflation-adjusted terms) over time.

⁵ Ind. Code 8-1-8.5-10(j) states that under the overall reasonableness evaluation of a Plan, the Commission must consider, among other items, “Comments provided by customers, customer representatives, the office of utility consumer counselor, and other stakeholders concerning the adequacy and reasonableness of the plan, including alternative or additional means to achieve energy efficiency in the electricity supplier’s service territory” and “The electricity supplier’s current integrated resource plan and the underlying resource assessment.”

1 **II. FAILURES AND LIMITATIONS IN VECTREN’S 2016 IRP DUE TO**
2 **VECTREN WITNESS STEVIE’S UNDERLYING DSM COST**
3 **ASSUMPTIONS.**
4

5 **Q. Have you reviewed the testimony of Richard Stevie marked as Petitioner’s**
6 **Exhibit 2?**

7 **A.** Yes, I have reviewed Vectren Witness Stevie’s testimony and attachments.

8 **Q. On pages 13-17 of Petitioner’s Exhibit 2, Vectren Witness Stevie explains**
9 **Vectren’s rationale for limiting incremental energy savings to 2 percent of**
10 **eligible retail sales per year. Please summarize this rationale.**

11 **A.** Vectren Witness Stevie states that—based on various studies of energy efficiency
12 potential—Vectren chose 40 percent of eligible retail sales for additional
13 cumulative efficiency savings (starting in 2018) as the total amount of DSM
14 available or possible to then be an input into Vectren’s 2016 IRP. He offered that
15 2 percent of eligible retail sales per year, starting in 2018, adds up to 40 percent of
16 eligible retail sales in total over 20 years:

17 *Vectren South chose to make up to 2% of eligible retail sales as*
18 *DSM resource options available for selection in the IRP process*
19 *for each year beginning in 2018. This represents almost 40% of*
20 *eligible retail sales, far above estimates of even technical market*
21 *potential.)⁶*

22 **Q. Do you agree with Vectren’s rationale for limiting incremental energy**
23 **savings to 2 percent of eligible retail sales per year, as described by Witness**
24 **Stevie?**

⁶ Petitioner’s Exhibit 2 at 17.

1 **A.** No. The way in which Vectren slowly adds 2 percent per year to eventually reach
2 the 40 percent maximum is unreasonable, and Vectren Witness Stevie’s testimony
3 presents no reasoning behind this slow pace of adoption as an input into Vectren’s
4 2016 IRP. Two percent incremental savings per year is not the only way to add up
5 to 40 percent additional cumulative savings over time. If Vectren believes that an
6 additional 40 percent cumulative energy efficiency savings is available and that
7 energy efficiency has the potential to lower customer costs (in comparison to
8 generation alternatives), then I can see no reason for slowly adding 2 percent per
9 year to eventually reach the 40 percent maximum.

10 Logically, Vectren should offer as much energy efficiency into its IRP as
11 it can each and every year, with the goal of reaching and exceeding 40 percent
12 efficiency savings (and getting maximum cost savings to customers) as quickly as
13 is feasible. By spreading out the 40 percent efficiency savings equally over the
14 twenty years, Vectren has created an annual ceiling and an artificial, equal
15 division of savings by year. If there is some other rationale for limiting
16 incremental efficiency savings to 2 percent per year in this three-year plan,
17 Vectren Witness Stevie fails to describe or explain it.

18 **Q.** **Does CAC have an alternative proposal to using savings to judge consistency**
19 **between the IRP and DSM plans?**

20 **A.** Yes. Please see the testimony of CAC Witness Sommer, who describes an
21 alternative method to reconcile IRP and DSM plan savings using the IRP results
22 to help inform the cost-effectiveness screening that occurs within the DSM plan. I

1 submitted the same proposal in the currently pending case docketed as Cause No.
2 43955 DSM 4.

3 **Q. Witness Stevie provides Vectren South with a forecast of future energy**
4 **efficiency prices. Does Vectren Witness Stevie explain his rationale and**
5 **methodology for this forecast?**

6 **A.** Yes.

7 **Q. Does the current energy efficiency literature provide guidance on how energy**
8 **efficiency prices will change over time as the size of energy efficiency**
9 **programs (their “market penetration”) increases?**

10 **A.** I agree with Vectren Witness Stevie that the current literature does not provide
11 such guidance:

12 *The energy efficiency literature does not provide adequate*
13 *guidance.⁷*

14 **Q. In the absence of such guidance, what methodology does Witness Stevie**
15 **utilize in the energy efficiency cost projections used by Vectren in its 2018-**
16 **2020 DSM Plan at issue here?**

17 **A.** Vectren Witness Stevie created his own, new, un-vetted methodology:

18 *Based upon my research into this issue, I provided Vectren South*
19 *with a methodology to estimate how the cost to achieve an*
20 *increment of EE could change as the cumulative EE market*
21 *penetration rises.⁸*

22 **Q. Vectren Witness Stevie concludes that “The study found that EE program**
23 **costs per kWh increase as the cumulative penetration of EE increases, as**

⁷ Petitioner’s Exhibit 2 at 18.

⁸ Petitioner’s Exhibit 2 at 19.

1 **measured by the percent of retail sales.”⁹ and escalates Vectren’s projected**
2 **energy efficiency costs over time on this basis. Do you agree with his**
3 **conclusion?**

4 **A.** No. I do not agree that Vectren Witness Stevie’s study provides evidence that
5 energy efficiency program costs per kWh increase as cumulative savings as a
6 percentage of sales increase.

7 Further, I disagree both with the methodology used by Witness Stevie in
8 his 2015 study¹⁰ and with his application of that 2015 study’s results to Vectren’s
9 efficiency cost projections.

10 **Q.** **Vectren Witness Stevie says that “The primary focus of the research [in his**
11 **2015 study] was to examine if and to what extent the program cost of EE**
12 **changes as the available supply (i.e., retail sales) of EE is consumed through**
13 **implementation of EE programs.”¹¹ Does Witness Stevie’s 2015 working**
14 **paper¹² succeed in its purpose?**

15 **A.** No. While Vectren Witness Stevie’s 2015 analysis examines the relationship
16 between efficiency cost and cumulative savings, it does not provide new or usable
17 information and is not an appropriate source for determining expected future
18 efficiency costs for Vectren.

19 **Q.** **What critiques do you have of Witness Stevie’s 2015 analysis?**

⁹ Petitioner’s Exhibit 2 at 19.

¹⁰ Petitioner’s Exhibit 2, Attachment RGS-2.

¹¹ Petitioner’s Exhibit 2 at 19.

¹² Petitioner’s Exhibit 2, Attachment RGS-2.

1 A. In my attached report which updates the one previously submitted to the
2 Commission through the IRP stakeholder process, I make the following four
3 critiques of Vectren Witness Stevie's analysis:

4 (1) his analysis is not replicable (a fundamental expectation of any such analysis);

5 (2) he has used incorrect data, and correcting his data changes his results;

6 (3) correcting his data also renders his results statistically insignificant (that is, not
7 discernable from happenstance); and

8 (4) his analysis is not robust (his data are of low quality, and removing inaccurate
9 entries changes the results).¹³

10 **Q. Please explain your first critique: Witness Stevie's analysis is not replicable.**

11 A. Vectren Witness Stevie's analysis employs a regression methodology. This is a
12 common, well-understood methodology—so much so that given the same data
13 and basic description of a regression, anyone with statistical or econometric
14 expertise should be able to replicate the results of an analysis exactly. If a
15 regression cannot be replicated, it must be because either the data have been
16 recorded incorrectly or described incorrectly, and/or the regression methodology
17 itself was described incorrectly.

18 Witness Stevie creates two regression models—one using 2012-only data
19 and one using data reported from 2010-2012—and reports that his data for both
20 models are taken from energy efficiency cost and performance reported in Energy
21 Information Administration (EIA) Form 861. I was able to replicate Witness

¹³ Attachment EAS-2.

1 Stevie's 2012-only (Model 2) regression exactly using the data he provides in his
2 supporting spreadsheets.¹⁴

3 I was not, however, able to replicate the results of his 2010-2012 (Model
4 1) regression, even though I was using data provided by Witness Stevie and the
5 same data specifications used to exactly match the 2012-only regression. I can
6 only conclude that either the data provided by Witness Stevie was not the data
7 used to arrive at his findings, or his description of his 2010-2012 regression was
8 incomplete or inaccurate (see Table 2 below). I would describe the differences
9 between my replications and Witness Stevie's findings as small but troubling.

10 **Q. Please explain your second critique: Witness Stevie's analysis uses incorrect**
11 **data, resulting in incorrect findings.**

12 **A.** Vectren Witness Stevie provides both (1) sources for his data (in Petitioner's
13 Exhibit No.2, Attachment RGS-2) and (2) the data themselves in CAC Exhibit 1,
14 Attachment EAS-3.

15 In attempting to replicate his regression results using the actual data he
16 provided—as described in my reply to the previous question—I also checked to
17 see if the data that he provided matched the data sources that he cited. I found that
18 many of Witness Stevie's data points do not match the public sources of data that
19 he provided, as shown in Table 1:

¹⁴ Attachment EAS-3 consists of two spreadsheets provided by Vectren Witness Stevie.

1

Table 1. Percentage of erroneous data entries in Stevie data

	% non-match		
	2010	2011	2012
Program Costs (\$)	65%	27%	4%
Current Year Savings (kWh)	67%	27%	8%
Cumulative Savings (kWh)	65%	24%	6%
Total Revenue (\$)	0%	0%	0%
Total Sales (kWh)	31%	31%	31%

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Given these differences between the data provided and the actual source data, I reran the regressions described in Vectren Witness Stevie’s analysis with the corrected data. I found that changing these data to match the public sources of data that he provided changes the results of the analysis, as compared in Table 2. (“Original” is Witness Stevie’s reported regression results. “Replication” is my attempt to match his results using his data; “Replic_State” and “Replic_Year” are two different versions of my replication attempts, differentiated by the type of dummy variable.¹⁵ “Public Data” is the correct public data cited by Stevie. “Clean Data” is a subset of these Public Data, as discussed below.)

¹⁵ Witness Stevie appears to have assigned “dummy variables” to differentiate results by state. I attempted regression replications that differentiate results by state and, separately, by data year.

1 **Table 2. Comparison of regression results**

Model 1						
Results	Original	Replic_State	Replic_Year	Public Data	Clean Data	
Number of Observations	153	153	153	153	105	
Adjusted R²	0.76	0.76	0.73	0.19	0.57	
Coeff.	(Constant)	-17.82	-18.62	14.72***	1.55	12.92***
	LOG (UR)	2.44	2.15	-	2.92	1.06
	LOG (EE/kWh)	0.61***	0.61***	0.56***	-0.74	0.43*
	LOG (CUMEE/kWh)	0.28**	0.28**	0.28***	0.72	0.39
	LOG (REV*CPI_I/kWh)	-11.98	-11.99	-0.08	-0.21	0.24
Model 2						
Results	Original	Replication		Public Data	Clean Data	
Number of Observations	49	49		51	46	
Adjusted R²	0.54	0.54		0.08	0.57	
Coeff.	(Constant)	12.02***	12.02***		3.22	12.1***
	LOG (EE/kWh)	0.00	0.00		-0.76*	0.36
	LOG (CUMEE/kWh)	0.90***	0.90***		0.52	0.61*
	LOG (REV/kWh)	-0.84	-0.84		-1.93	-1.16
***P ≤ 0.001 ; **P ≤ 0.01 ; *P ≤ 0.05						

2
 3 The adjusted R-squared values estimate the overall statistical significance
 4 of the regression (how good of a “fit” the results are to the data). The coefficients
 5 (“coeff.”) in Table 1 are Stevie’s main regression result and can be interpreted as
 6 for every 1 percent change in Variable X expect a β percent change in Stevie
 7 dependent variable, energy efficiency program costs. For example, using the
 8 “Original” results from Stevie’s Model 1 would suggest that every 1 percent
 9 change in cumulative efficiency savings was associated with a 0.28 percent
 10 change in program costs. The asterisks (noted in the footnote to the table as
 11 different “P-values”) are indications of the statistical significance of each
 12 variable; the more asterisks the better job the coefficient is doing to represent the
 13 relationship between the variables. No asterisk or one asterisk suggest that the
 14 coefficient does not do a good job of representing relationships between variables.

1 I compared the Original results, reported by Witness Stevie, to the Public
2 Data results, which use the methodology reported by Witness Stevie but replaces
3 his flawed data with the correct public data. The Public Data results:

4 • Have much lower “Adjusted R²,” indicating a lower overall statistical
5 significance for these regressions than that reported by Witness Stevie.

6 This means that less import should be assigned to these findings because
7 the patterns identified by Witness Stevie are difficult to discern from
8 happenstance.

9 • Have different elasticities (or coefficients) than those estimated by
10 Witness Stevie for the unemployment rate (UR), percent of incremental
11 energy efficiency savings (EE/kWh), percent of cumulative energy
12 efficiency savings (CUMEE/kWh), and electricity price (REV/kWh). The
13 coefficients from Stevie’s regressions are what is used in Vectren’s
14 efficiency program cost projections, and correcting his underlying data
15 changes these results.

16 **Q. Please explain your third critique: Witness Stevie’s analysis uses incorrect**
17 **data, resulting in findings that are reported as statistically significant but, in**
18 **fact, are not.**

19 **A.** Using corrected data to run Witness Stevie’s regressions changed not only the
20 findings but the significance of those findings. Statistical significance can be
21 thought of as the degree of confidence that should be placed in regression findings.
22 As shown above in Table 2, correcting Witness Stevie’s data lowers the level of
23 significance for his explanatory variables (meaning that less confidence can be

1 placed in his results). When the correct data are used for Witness Stevie's
2 regressions, which are then plugged into project Vectren's energy efficiency costs
3 in its 2016 IRP, it flips Stevie's result on its head. Rather than saying there is a
4 significant impact in change of cumulative savings on program costs as
5 proclaimed by Witness Stevie, the regression performed with the correct data
6 suggest that no such relationship exists. Based on these corrected regression
7 results, there is no evidence for greater market penetration resulting in higher
8 efficiency costs.

9 Witness Stevie's main variable of interest, cumulative energy efficiency
10 savings, is statistically insignificant when either Model 1 or Model 2 is performed
11 with corrected data. This means that had Witness Stevie used the correct public
12 data, he could not have concluded that there was a meaningful relationship
13 between efficiency program costs and market penetration, which completely
14 undermines the energy efficiency cost projections he developed for Vectren's
15 2016 IRP.

16 **Q. Please explain your fourth critique: Witness Stevie's analysis is not robust.**

17 **A.** I took one further step in assessing the quality of Witness Stevie's regression
18 results: I evaluated the underlying data (from the original public sources) for
19 quality. Specifically, I rejected data points with the following characteristics with
20 the goal of examining how sensitive these regression results are to small changes
21 in the underlying data:

- 22 • I eliminated data points with \$0 or \$1 (that is, one dollar) recorded as
23 their efficiency costs.

- 1 • I eliminated data points for which incremental savings were recorded
2 as higher than cumulative savings, or where cumulative savings were
3 recorded as shrinking precipitously over time.

4 Overall, these eliminations reduced that number of data points in Model 1
5 from 153 to 105 and in Model 2 from 51 to 46. I reran the regressions described in
6 Witness Stevie’s analysis with the corrected (from public sources) and “Clean
7 Data” (with poor quality data points removed), which changed the results of the
8 analysis, as shown in Table 2 above. It improved the overall significance of the
9 regression and changed the values (and in some cases signs) of the coefficients,
10 but did little to improve the statistical significance of individual variables. Vectren
11 Witness Stevie’s analysis is not robust: Its results depend on the inclusion of
12 faulty data.

13 **Q. Given these methodological issues, do you recommend the use of Witness**
14 **Stevie’s analysis in utility planning?**

15 **A.** I do not. The analysis needs significant additional refinement to be used as a
16 source of assumptions for public policy decisions. Furthermore, Vectren Witness
17 Stevie’s results rely on a data set that is so small as to call into question the value
18 of regression as a methodology here.

19 **Q. Based on your rerunning of Witness Stevie’s regressions using improved**
20 **data as described in Attachment EAS-2, what can you suggest regarding**
21 **Witness Stevie’s findings and their use in efficiency cost forecasting?**

22 **A.** My regression analysis was limited to attempts to replicate Witness Stevie’s
23 results and examination of the sensitivity of his results to data corrections. In my

1 opinion, Witness Stevie's findings, taken together with my own explorations of
2 his findings, do not amount to evidence sufficient for use in utility planning
3 decisions.

4 **Q. If Witness Stevie's regression results were replicable, based on both correct**
5 **data and on high-quality data, would you then support their use in**
6 **forecasting Vectren's energy efficiency costs?**

7 **A.** No, I would not. In addition to finding fault with the data and methodology of
8 Witness Stevie's underlying regression analysis, I cannot support the
9 methodology used by Witness Stevie to apply his regression findings to
10 predictions of Vectren's expected future efficiency costs. Even if Stevie's
11 regression analysis had produced a robust estimation of the expected quantitative
12 relationship between cumulative savings and program costs, the way in which it is
13 applied to cost projections appears to include several errors that impact the
14 predicted costs.

15 **Q. What errors have you identified in Witness Stevie's application of his**
16 **regression findings to efficiency cost projections?**

17 **A.** I have identified four main errors in Witness Stevie's application of his regression
18 findings to efficiency cost projections (provided to CAC as Base DSM Modeling
19 File—Confidential.xlsx and included in this submission as CAC Exhibit 1,
20 Attachment EAS-4-Confidential):

21 (1) the basis for his efficiency cost growth factors are artificially inflated;
22 (2) he uses his regression results selectively, ignoring certain findings;

1 (3) his 2017 efficiency costs are erroneously based on expected cumulative
2 savings in 2036; and

3 (4) he confuses the effects of changes over time with the effects of differing
4 policy choices within a single year.

5 **Q. Please explain your first critique: the basis for Witness Stevie's efficiency**
6 **cost growth factor is artificially inflated.**

7 **A.** The coefficients for cumulative energy efficiency savings identified by Witness
8 Stevie in his regression analysis are interpreted as "elasticities", meaning that they
9 can be interpreted as follows: a 1 percent change in cumulative energy efficiency
10 savings is assumed to result in an X percent change in program costs, where X is
11 the reported coefficient from the statistical model. So, for example, according to
12 Witness Stevie's cost growth factor methodology and assuming his Model 1 were
13 correct, a 1 percent increase in cumulative energy efficiency savings would
14 increase program costs by 0.28 percent. Witness Stevie has performed a
15 regression on three years of data (Model 1: 2010-2012) to estimate this coefficient.
16 He then repeats this regression on a subset (just one year) of these same data
17 (Model 2: 2012 only) and identifies a second, higher, coefficient. Finally, Stevie
18 averages the two coefficients together to get his result.

19 This methodology is non-standard and, frankly, rather surprising. I can
20 think of no justification for it. This is like finding that the preliminary result for
21 years A, B, and C is zero (0), but the result for year A alone is ten (10), and
22 concluding from that, therefore, the correct result for A, B, and C is somehow the
23 average of zero and ten: five (5).

1 **ABC = 0**

2 **A = 10**

3 **Therefore: ABC = 5**

4 Witness Stevie's methodology is not sound. In Vectren's DSM plan, it
5 doubles the rate of efficiency program cost growth used by Vectren as an input
6 into the 2016 IRP.

7 **Q. Please explain your second critique: Witness Stevie uses his regression results**
8 **selectively, ignoring certain findings.**

9 **A.** Cumulative energy efficiency savings were not the only variable for which
10 Vectren Witness Stevie reported a statistically significant relationship to program
11 costs, but cumulative energy efficiency savings were the only variable that Stevie
12 applied to these efficiency cost growth predictions. Witness Stevie finds a
13 significant relationship between incremental efficiency savings and program costs
14 in his Model 1, and he finds a significant relationship between electricity prices
15 and program costs in both Model 1 and Model 2. In both models, he finds that
16 higher electricity prices are associated with lower program costs, but he does not
17 apply this finding to his projected program costs. The cumulative savings finding
18 is "cherry picked" from among the larger regression and other coefficients.

19 Electricity prices are expected to rise in Indiana over time. My
20 calculations suggested that including this effect on a forecasted growth of electric
21 rates ranging from 0.7 percent per year¹⁶ to 3.2 percent per year¹⁷ results in a

¹⁶ Petitioner's Exhibit 1, Attachment RHH-1 (Vectren 2016 IRP Attachment 4.1) at 95.

1 decrease in the incremental change in program costs of 4 to 20 percentage points
2 in each year averaged across Witness Stevie's two models. Put into context, just
3 this countervailing effect would reduce Witness Stevie's 0.6 percent increase in
4 efficiency costs due for each 1.0 percent increase in market saturation down to
5 0.40 to 0.56 percent, without any consideration of the other errors in Witness
6 Stevie's analysis. I can think of no justification for excluding the expected effect
7 of changing electricity prices on program costs from Witness Stevie's projected
8 efficiency costs.

9 **Q. Please explain your third critique: Witness Stevie's 2016 efficiency costs are**
10 **erroneously based on expected cumulative savings in 2036.**

11 **A.** Witness Stevie applies a different growth rate and starts from a different cost
12 assumption for savings between 1 and 2 percent of eligible sales. For example, he
13 projects that the first 0.25 percent of savings would cost \$0.03322 per kWh in
14 2016, while the fifth block with savings from 1 to 1.25 percent would cost
15 \$0.07811 per kWh in 2016. The \$0.07811 per kWh cost is based on his assumed
16 level of savings and costs in 2036 and not on 2016 values.

17 He compounds this same error by calculating 2016 energy efficiency
18 prices and costs from this growth rate by again using the 2036 efficiency price
19 (that is, he makes the same error twice in his calculations). I can think of no
20 justification for this methodology. Witness Stevie has based 2016 energy
21 efficiency cost growth rates and efficiency costs on the growth rates and costs

¹⁷ 2016 Residential Bill Survey. Available at:
http://www.in.gov/iurc/files/2016_Residential_Bill_Survey_Presentation.pdf

1 reached after an additional 19 percent cumulative savings have been added in
2 2036. The effect of this error is that the efficiency price per kWh for the fifth
3 block of savings put into the 2016 IRP is more than double that of the fourth
4 block of savings.

5 **Q. Please explain your fourth critique: Witness Stevie confuses the effects of**
6 **changes over time with the effects of differing policy choices within a single**
7 **year.**

8 **A.** Even if Witness Stevie’s model results were accurate and applied properly to the
9 Vectren system, he is forecasting year-to-year changes in cost as the *annual*
10 cumulative sum of energy efficiency increases. Despite this, he also applies his
11 results to intra-annual changes in savings. So the *cost per unit of energy saved*,
12 not just the total cost of the program, increases as savings increase.

13 For example, if Vectren deployed programs that achieved 1.50% savings
14 in any given year Stevie assumes that those savings would cost more per unit of
15 energy saved than if Vectren deployed a program that saved 1.25%. There is no
16 logical basis for extrapolating his regression results to such effects because he
17 estimates the relationship between market penetration and program costs from
18 year to year—not the relationship between incremental annual savings and
19 program costs within the same year. I can think of no justification for this
20 methodology.

21 **Q. Given the critiques that you have presented of Witness Stevie’s regression**
22 **analysis and its application, can you recommend the use of these findings in**
23 **predicting the future cost of energy efficiency?**

1 A. No. I do not recommend using either Witness Stevie’s regression results or his
2 method of applying regression results to efficiency cost projections—whether
3 used singly or together. The flaws in the Witness Stevie analysis are serious and,
4 in my opinion, entirely undermine Vectren’s 2016 IRP and its usefulness in
5 guiding DSM decisions.

6 Q. Vectren states that “While they assert that “they are aware of no reliable
7 evidence for higher energy efficiency market penetration leading to higher
8 efficiency costs” (Environmentalists Comments, p. 35), Vectren South’s own
9 historical experience is that adoption of energy efficiency measures become
10 more expensive once market saturation occurs. This result is logical—more
11 work, and thus more cost, is required to capture the attention of those
12 consumers who have not already taken advantage of energy efficiency
13 measures that have been available for several years. Those consumers are
14 either not initially interested (and require increased marketing to reach) or
15 require an increased incentive to adopt the energy efficiency
16 measure.”(Vectren reply, p.19) Does Vectren assertion amount to evidence
17 for the assumption that higher market penetration results in higher program
18 costs?

19 A. No. Analysis is the way in which historical experience is quantified and
20 introduced as evidence. Vectren South has not provided any analysis regarding its
21 historical experience of the relationship between efficiency market penetration and
22 program costs. Instead, they offer the assertion—without evidence—that such a
23 relationship exists. If evidence of the asserted relationship exists and is made

1 available to stakeholders, I will review and comment on it. Such an analysis must
2 control for factors that influence cost like the exclusion of opt-out customers and
3 the quality of program implementation.

4 **III. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS.**

5 **Q. Please summarize your recommendations.**

6 **A.** Vectren’s 2016 IRP, specifically as it relates to DSM cost projections, depends
7 heavily on an analysis performed by Vectren Witness Stevie. Vectren Witness
8 Stevie’s projected increase in future energy efficiency costs is based on faulty
9 data, an incorrect interpretation of statistical results, and a deeply flawed
10 application of those results to predicted costs.

11 Because Vectren’s 2016 IRP depends so heavily on Vectren Witness
12 Stevie’s flawed cost projections, Vectren cannot demonstrate that its 2016 IRP
13 arrives at an optimal balance that “can only result[] from a well-developed and
14 reasoned IRP that evaluates the appropriate balance of new supply-side and
15 demand-side resources taking account of risks and uncertainty” pursuant to Ind.
16 Code § 8-1-8.5-10(c). Cause No. 43955 DSM 3, Final Order at 45; *see also* Final
17 Order, Cause No. 44634 at 34. I recommend against using these findings as they
18 are inadequate and unreasonable,¹⁸ given that (as Vectren Witness Stevie

¹⁸ Ind. Code 8-1-8.5-10(j) states that under the overall reasonableness evaluation of a Plan, the Commission must consider, among other items, “Comments provided by customers, customer representatives, the office of utility consumer counselor, and other stakeholders concerning the adequacy and reasonableness of the plan, including

1 acknowledges) no useable prediction of the impact of efficiency market
2 penetration on program costs exists. Instead, I suggest that the correct assumption
3 to use in IRP modeling is that inflation-adjusted efficiency costs remain constant
4 over time.

5 **Q. Does this conclude your testimony?**

6 **A. Yes.**

alternative or additional means to achieve energy efficiency in the electricity supplier's service territory" and "The electricity supplier's current integrated resource plan and the underlying resource assessment."